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he European 
Commission 
presented a 
new ‘Border Package’ 
on 13 February 2008, 
setting out its vision of 
how to foster the further management of the EU’s 
external border. Billed in a Commission press release as a 
“comprehensive vision for an integrated European border 
management system for the 21st century”, one of the key 
elements of this package
1 is a Communication aimed at 
establishing an EU entry/exit system registering the 
movement of specific categories of third country 
nationals
2 at the external borders of the EU.
3 This 
Communication furthermore recommends the setting up 
of an Automated Border Control System enabling the 
automated verification of a traveller’s identity (for both 
citizens and non-EU citizens alike), based on biometric 
technology as well as an Electronic Travel Authorisation 
System – abbreviated to ETA
4 – which would oblige non-
EU travellers to provide personal data for a pre-departure 
online check. 
These security tools and techniques imply: 
1.  The setting up of a new European-wide database 
containing specific information on certain 
categories of non EU-nationals; 
                                                      
1 A Communication on the evaluation and further development 
of the EU’s external border agency Frontex as well as a 
Communication examining the establishment of a satellite-based 
border surveillance system (Eurosur) are the other elements of 
the package. 
2 All non-EU citizens. 
3 Commission Communication, Preparing the next steps in 
border management in the European Union, COM(2008) 69 
final, 13.2.2008. 
4 Whether this commonly used abbreviation was chosen 
accidentally remains unclear. 
2.  Interoperability of the database with other 
already existing and planned EU databases 
and biometric systems; and 
3.  The systematic checking of everyone 
entering and leaving the EU for at least three 
categories of persons: 
•  third country nationals who have visas 
containing biometric data, which will be 
checked at the border, 
•  third country nationals who do not need 
visas for a short stay in the EU whose 
biometric data will be taken at the border 
and  
•  citizens of the EU whose biometric data 
will be incorporated into their passports 
which will be swiped on entry and exit. 
The proposal raises several important questions: 
Is it feasible and necessary? Does it have a 
legitimate objective? Is it consistent with EU data 
protection rules, fundamental rights and the 
principle of proportionality? Is there any 
appreciable added value of such a system, 
bearing in mind its many costs? 
1.  An outline of the proposed 
measures  
The main group of people targeted by the EU 
entry/exit system are third country nationals 
admitted for a short-stay of up to three months, 
regardless of whether they require a visa to enter 
the EU or not. Only holders of a local border 
permit, national long-stay visa or a residence 
T 
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permit as well as third country nationals who are 
exempted from stamping (e.g. pilots, seamen of cruise 
ships, diplomats, etc.) will not be registered in the 
system. The database will include data on the time and 
place of entry, the length of stay authorised, the 
transmission of automated alerts to the competent 
authorities as well as biometric data of the people 
registered. 
The Communication furthermore suggests that those 
falling within the category of ‘low-risk travellers’ could 
be awarded a Registered Traveller Status and be 
subject to an automated regime of control. The criteria 
for labelling someone as ‘low-risk’ would include, in 
the words of the Communication, factors such as a 
reliable travel history (mainly no previous overstays), 
evidence of sufficient financial means, holding a 
biometric passport containing fingerprints, successful 
visa applications, etc. However, to become a low-risk 
traveller, the third country national needs to have 
previously travelled to the EU and stayed for a while. 
There is no obvious way in which a third country 
national who has never been to the EU could obtain 
that status.  
The Communication then recommends exploring the 
possibilities for setting up a European Electronic 
Travel Authorisation (ETA) system that will request 
third country nationals to make an electronic 
application supplying personal and passport data before 
departure, which would be a condition for their entry 
into the EU. A third country traveller would only be 
allowed to enter when the on-line check against certain 
databases reveals no contrary indicator. 
However, it is not only foreigners who are expected to 
‘profit’ from the new era of ‘border control by 
technology’ liberated from any border guard 
interaction. The Automated Border Control System 
will also apply to EU citizens entering and leaving the 
external border. EU citizens will have to have an e-
passport containing biometric data (expected to be in 
place by 2019 for two biometric identifiers) which the 
system can read and check against EU and national 
databases. The Commission’s impact assessment reads 
as follows in this respect: “The primary requirement of 
an Automated Border Control process for EU citizens 
is to automatically verify the claim of EU citizenship 
through the authentication of the travel document and 
traveller”.
5 Undoubtedly, a remarkable vision for the 
21
st century: machines at border crossing points will 
henceforth determine whether an EU citizen’s claim of 
his EU citizenship is verified! 
                                                      
5 Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying 
document to the Commission Communication, Preparing the 
next steps in border management in the European Union, 
COM(2008) 69 final, 13.2.2008, p. 55. 
2.  A critical assessment 
As regards the collection of personal data, 
European databases, whether public or private, 
are subject to laws. These laws, at national and 
EU level, have been designed to protect the 
individual against misuse of his or her data. A 
number of principles are at the heart of this 
system, as contained for instance in the Council 
data protection Directive 95/46
6 and in Article 8 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
Union.
7 Among the most important of the 
principles regulating European databases in the 
scope of the EC legal regime are the general 
principles of EC law, and particularly those of 
proportionality and fundamental rights. 
Whenever a public authority at EU or national 
level plans the development and implementation 
of a new database containing personal data of 
individuals, and therefore potentially affecting 
the right to data protection, the following 
questions must be addressed: What are the goals 
pursued by this database? Do they correspond to 
a real social need that is legitimate and goes no 
further than what is necessary to achieve the 
purported objective? What are the mechanisms of 
protection offered to the fundamental rights of the 
targeted individual? 
A certain tension arises between the 
Commission’s vision and recommendations and 
the tests of proportionality and fundamental 
rights. This tension becomes evident when 
looking at the objectives pursued by the proposal 
and their repercussions on liberty, which may be 
summarised as follows: 
First, it is claimed that this EU system would 
facilitate the entry of bona fide travellers. 
However, as far as we have been able to 
ascertain,  bona fide travellers do not currently 
encounter any obstacles to entry that such a 
system might address. The development of EC 
Visa Facilitation Agreements with most of the 
countries in the European region, including for 
instance Russia, are already designed to facilitate 
the entry of bona fide third country nationals, and 
even these agreements, which cut the red tape, 
                                                      
6 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data,  OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995. Article 1.1 states that “1. In accordance with 
this Directive, Member States shall protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and 
in particular their right to privacy with respect to the 
processing of personal data”. 
7 Article 8.1 stipulates that “Everyone has the right to the 
protection of personal data concerning him or her”. The Commission’s New Border Package | 3 
have been subject to criticism. A measure that would 
increase red tape and the risk of mistake, error and 
malice is unlikely to facilitate entry of bona fide 
travellers.  
Second, very few third country nationals issued with 
visas face any difficulty at the EU external border, and 
this proposal addresses first and foremost third country 
nationals who require visas to come to the EU. If EU 
visa officers in the countries of origin do their job 
properly then they command the respect of their 
counterparts at the external frontier. The introduction 
of another system of checks and the creation of a new 
database are likely to increase suspicion between visa 
officers abroad and border guards at the external 
frontier. There will no longer be the presumption that 
everyone is doing their job correctly but rather the risk 
of introducing a culture where every official is 
checking and doubting the work of his or her 
colleagues, all directed towards excluding third country 
nationals. 
Third, the proposal also suggests that such a system 
would assist in determining how many third country 
nationals overstay their visas each year. This objective, 
however, is statistical in nature and would be addressed 
with much less expense and intrusion into the lives and 
rights of individuals by clever proposals from 
statisticians on how to capture data. Quite rightly, the 
proposal does not suggest that the system would have 
any actual consequence for third country nationals 
overstaying their visas since finding them is quite 
another matter from simply registering who entered and 
who left into a database. And this leaves aside the 
further complications of dual nationals, third country 
national family members of EU nationals, third country 
nationals arriving on tourist visas to the EU but have a 
right of residence, asylum seekers who are lawfully in 
the EU while their application for protection is under 
consideration and all those other cases where an 
individual’s status changes while s/he is in the EU. The 
certainty of miscalculation, erring on the side of over-
counting, would only create anxiety in a public already 
concerned about the adequacy of immigration controls 
at the external borders. 
Fourth, not one of the above considerations addresses 
the rights of a data subject to privacy and protection. 
Not only is the proportionality of the initiative most 
acutely in question here, but it also open questions such 
as the length of time for which the data would be 
retained, the duty to limit who has access to that data 
and the right to correction of the data remain 
unanswered. In fact, what would be the mechanisms 
and guarantees at the disposal of the targeted third 
country national to resist any possible disproportionate 
and intrusive practice in the scope of the EU entry/exit 
system? This question should also trouble EU citizens 
as they are intended to be subject to the Automated 
Border Control System. Although it is stated that 
their data would not be stored, the automated gate 
system would nevertheless “read and extract the 
information from the travel document, capturing 
biometrics and performing the verification to 
enable entry or exit, as a well as random checks 
of the SIS and national databases.”
8 What kind of 
national databases is not further specified and in 
the age of ‘interoperability’ anything might be 
possible one day, including national tax 
authorities, social welfare offices, etc. 
It is surprising that the Communication attempts 
to present the establishment of these security 
tools “for the benefit of” bona fide travellers, who 
would then experience an automated and faster 
processing at EU external borders. There appears 
to be an untested belief shared by some EU 
officials that this logic of acceleration in people’s 
lives should take precedence over its implications 
for fundamental rights, and particularly that of 
data protection. Also, the Europeanisation 
processes are fostering the belief that technology 
represents the solution to any imagined threat to 
security, without duly considering that it may end 
up creating more insecurity in terms of data 
protection.
9 Rapidity is often difficult to reconcile 
with liberty, as judges well know. The 
Commission should better acknowledge the fact 
that the use of technology primarily aims at 
increasing and dispersing mobility control, not 
making the lives of individuals easier. This 
strategy leads to intrusive practices into 
individuals’ lives. The EU entry/exit system may 
confront the EU and its member states with 
serious difficulties with respect to the principles 
of liberty, fundamental freedoms and the rule of 
law as stipulated in Article 6 Treaty on European 
Union. 
Fifth, although the question of feasibility might 
be one for the technical experts to answer in the 
first place, it is worth imagining the dimensions 
required to realise the proposal. The logistics of 
getting every border post in 28 countries 
(assuming Ireland and the UK are out but 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland will 
be in via their Schengen participation) tooled up 
and connected to such a system – which is a 
precondition for its working – are gigantic. 
Making sure that the system and its interlinkages 
                                                      
8 Commission Communication, Preparing the next steps 
in border management in the European Union, 
COM(2008) 69 final, 13.2.2008, p. 6. 
9 On this latter aspect, see D. Bigo and S. Carrera, “From 
New York to Madrid: Technology as the Ultra-Solution 
to the Permanent State of Fear and Emergency in the 
EU”, CEPS Commentary, April 2004. 4 | Guild, Carrera & Geyer 
with all the other EU databases are secure will be even 
more challenging. At the rate at which personal 
information is currently misplaced or corrupted by 
administrations around the EU, it will not be surprising 
if experts have differing views on the feasibility of such 
a project. 
Sixth, in light of systems and databases already in place 
or soon to be active, one wonders whether this new 
package is actually necessary; this in particular when 
measuring it against its possible negative trajectories. 
All third country nationals who need a visa to enter EU 
territory will already be registered in the soon-to-be 
Visa Information System (VIS). Name, address, 
occupation as well as visa-application history, 
biometric photograph and fingerprints will be stored 
and available for immigration and law enforcement 
purposes. Next, we have the database EURODAC to 
gather and store data on asylum seekers and persons 
apprehended in connection with irregular crossings of 
external borders. On top of that, EURODAC is also 
available to run searches on third-country nationals 
found illegally present in a member state, which 
includes ‘visa over-stayers’. Then there is the Schengen 
Information System (SIS), which contains nearly a 
million entries on wanted persons, the majority of 
whom are persons who should be denied entry to the 
Schengen area. SIS (as well as national databases in 
member states) are consulted not only during the visa 
application procedure but again at the border post itself. 
At EU borders, the Schengen Borders Code requires 
EU border guards to conduct a “thorough check” of 
third country nationals. This implies a check to 
determine the purpose of stay as well as the existence 
of sufficient means of subsistence. A stamp has to be 
affixed in the traveller’s document stating the date of 
entry. Additional checks of the person, including yet 
another search in SIS and national databases, are 
possible when leaving EU territory. 
This, however, is not all. Before arriving at EU borders, 
Directive 2004/82/EC
10 requires air carriers to supply 
EU border authorities in advance with an extensive set 
of personal data of all travellers on incoming flights 
allowing the authorities to perform security checks 
even before travellers physically appear at the border 
post. Surprisingly, this Directive is not even mentioned 
in the Communication (although it has been 
acknowledged in the impact assessment). Finally, there 
is also the Commission’s proposal to establish an EU 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) System,
11 mimicking 
the EU-US PNR agreement of July 2007 which itself 
                                                      
10 Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the 
obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data, OJ L 261, 
6.8.2004, p. 24. 
11 Commission proposal for a Council Framework Decision on 
the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement 
purposes, COM(2007) 654 final, 6.11.2007.  
has been much criticised by the European 
Parliament’s LIBE Committee as well as national 
parliaments.
12 Even more personal data than 
under Directive 2004/82/EC, including payment 
information, seat number, travel agent, baggage 
information, etc., on all passengers entering or 
leaving EU territory by airplane should be 
gathered, stored, processed and analysed under 
this PNR scheme.  
And yet, all this is not enough, the Commission 
argues. We are asked to believe that new 
measures or, as formulated by the 
Communication, “additional layers of security” 
are needed. It seems as if the Commission wants 
to soothe our fears and anxieties (stirred by actual 
and perceived threats
13) with a bittersweet EU 
‘millefeuille of security’. 
3.  Conclusions 
The Commission’s proposal is ill-considered and 
is likely to have substantial counterproductive 
effects on the ground. It is expected to create the 
same sort of public relations problems as do 
similar US measures among a travelling public 
that finds itself increasingly the object of state 
suspicion, with no concrete reason or grounds. 
The case of Senator Edward M. (‘Ted’) Kennedy 
who found himself on the ‘no-fly list’ being 
repeatedly detained and questioned at airports is 
just one, but a very prominent example.
14  
It is by no means clear that the proposed 
entry/exit system will provide any useful or 
reliable data on overstays by third country 
nationals in the EU. It does not present any 
reasonable and proportionate objective that is 
discernable from the Communication and it is 
likely to offend a myriad of European laws and 
principles of data protection and use.  
The EU and its institutions, as well as the 
member states, need to comply with the EU legal 
system of guarantees and protection offered to the 
individual at times of applying EC law and 
implementing the EU integrated border 
management strategy. The latter should position 
the rule of law as one of its founding premises. In 
fact, it is the relationship between proportionality, 
data protection and the new security 
technological systems of surveillance proposed 
                                                      
12 See e.g. German Bundesrat, Bundesratsdrucksache 
826/1/07, 4 February 2008. 
13 An account of which is provided in the European 
Security Strategy of 12 December 2003, entitled “A 
secure Europe in a better world”. 
14 “Senator Kennedy flagged by no-fly list”, Washington 
Post, 20 August 2004. The Commission’s New Border Package | 5 
by the Communication that is the real challenge for a 
“comprehensive vision for an integrated European 
border management system for the 21st century”. 
4.  Recommendations 
The Commission envisages the system to be 
operational by 2015. However, the Communication 
itself is just the first step. Legislative amendments to 
the Schengen Border Code, the Common Consular 
Instructions, as well as separate decisions will be 
required to implement all the envisaged measures. 
These have so far not been proposed. In fact, the 
Commission committed itself to assess the presentation 
of concrete legislative proposals based on the 
discussions of its Communication, which is expected to 
take place in the European Parliament and the 
Council.
15 The Commission furthermore emphasised 
that the EU must remain open and accessible to others 
if it wants to share its values and support economic 
growth.
16  
In light of this commitment, we recommend the 
following steps: 
•  All involved actors should carefully and 
thoroughly establish whether the envisaged 
measures are truly necessary and proportional 
and live up to our vision of an open and 
welcoming Union that is founded on the 
principles of liberty, respect for human rights 
and the rule of law (Art. 6 TEU). 
                                                      
15 The Ministerial Conference on the Challenges of the EU 
External Border Management, to be convened by the Slovenian 
Presidency on 11-12 March 2008 should provide a first suitable 
venue for debate and reflection. 
16 Commission Communication, Preparing the next steps in 
border management in the European Union, COM(2008) 69 
final, 13.2.2008, p. 2. 
•  The enhanced use of new technologies in 
the changing landscape of European 
security policies must be duly tested 
against its ethical implications. 
•  No new EU large-scale IT systems of the 
dimensions of SIS II and VIS should be 
agreed upon and established before SIS II 
and VIS are actually operational and 
have proven to be proportional, safe and 
reliable. 
•  The Commission and the private sector 
should seriously advance the idea of 
‘data protection by design’
17 and make it 
an obligatory element in the 
programming of new and existing 
databases. 
•  Finally, none of the legislative proposals 
required to install the Commission’s new 
Border Package should be tabled before 
the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force, 
providing for the necessary democratic 
and judicial checks and balances. 
                                                      
17 See presentation by the German Federal Commissioner 
for Data Protection, Peter Schaar, “Should we switch off 
the internet?”,  at the 27
th International Conference of 
Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, 14-16 
September 2005 (available at 
http://www.privacyconference2005.org/fileadmin/PDF/ps
chaar.pdf). This idea entails the concept that data 
protection elements, like purpose limitation, rules on 
transmission, storage time, information to the data 
subject, etc. are governed automatically. For example, 
after the legally allowed data retention period, the stored 
set of data would automatically be deleted from the 
database. Similarly an automated notification could be 
sent out to the individual once his/her personal data has 
been stored in a database. 